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In the scope of portal  development, in order to talk about security issues, concerns, and 
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Introduction 
In  recent  years,  more  and  more 
companies  have  been  creating  portals  in 
order to offer to their employees, partners 
and  customers  to  access  critical  and 
sensitive  information.  Most  portal 
developers have applied high level security 
challenges  in  this  regard.  Many  vendors 
have  created  particular  interrelated 
solutions  for  some  of  the  security 
requirements, trying to tie developers to a 
particular product. Generally, this is a good 
choice  and  often  works  well  until  the 
product doesn’t work [11]. In this case, the 
software  is  no  longer  supported,  or  you 
need to readjust the architecture. Of course 
that a developer who has been in that boat 
feels his pain because he has been there. It 
appears  a  question:  How  can  portal 
developers  meet  their  security  challenges 
with  a  standards-based,  open-source 
security solution? This paper answers that 
question – first, presenting some essential 
security concepts, and then by highlighting 
you standards, techniques and open-source 
tools that it can use in order to secure your 
portal solution [8].  
Second,  this  paper  will  talk  about  Grid 
portals, which are an increasingly popular 
mechanism  for  creating  customizable, 
Web-based interfaces to Grid services and 
resources.  Due  to  the  powerful,  general-
purpose  nature  of  Grid  technology,  the 
security of any portal or entry point to such 
resources  cannot  be  taken  lightly,  in 
particular if the portal is running inside of 
the  trusted  perimeter,  such  as  a  Science 
Gateway running on an SDSC machine for 
access to the TeraGrid. 
 
2.  Core Security Concepts. 
First, we will talk about the main concepts 
regarding portal security 
 
2.1. Authentication 
Authentication  is  the  first  point  in 
providing access control and this involves 
validating the identity of a user. Most of 
cases  in  a  portal  environment, 
authentication  may  be  achieved  through 
user  name/password  login,  validating  a 
user’s  client  certificate,  or  through 
validation  via  smart  card  or  biometric 
device. 
In  order  to  proceed,  authentication  it  is 
necessary  to  develop  a  solution  which  is 
usually based on a repository for validating 
these identities and integrating it with the 
system.  Regarding  it,  a  mutual 
authentication  means  to  provide  the 
identification for both of parties involved 
in communication, and this is done using a 
particular  security  protocols,  such  as 
SSL/TLS. To ensure that the message was 
sent  by  the  expected  sender,  it  is  used  a 
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message origin authentication which is not 
replayed. [15] 
Being one of the most important aspects to 
providing  security,  authentication  at  the 
portal  level  will  dictate  how  your 
application interacts  with  other enterprise 
applications and Web services. [7] 
 
2.2.Authorization 
When an user is validated, the next step we 
have  to  assume  is  what  the  user  has 
permission  to  do.  The  access  control 
separation  in  two  distinct  mechanisms, 
authentication and authorization, provides 
a  logical  separation  of  first  validating 
identity,  and  then  validating  what 
resources that entity has access to consume 
or produce. Authorization defines the user 
permissions,  roles,  and  other  useful 
credentials which are used to permit access 
to certain portal services. An access control 
strategy  –  Role-Based  Access  Control 
(RBAC) is provided – (useful because of 
capability  is  prevalently  in  J2EE 
architectures). 
In extension, RBAC (as framework for the 
authorization  management  of  credentials) 
is  essentially  useful  in  many  portals, 
relational  databases,  or  commercial  web-
based systems. As it can be seen in Figure 
1, a key component of RBAC maps roles 
to  permissions,  and  maps  users  to  roles. 
There  are  also  shown  views  of  some 
authorization mechanisms of the traditional 
access control – using Access Control Lists 
(ACLs). So far, large and complex ACLs 
made  links  users-permissions,  and 
restricted  access  to  resources  by 
permissions  and  users.  Because  there  are 
many  cases  when  the  number  of 
permissions is usually very high, an access 
control lists for discretionary access can be 
difficult  to  be  kept  (with  subject  -object 
mappings).  So,  generally,  abstracting  the 
user and the resources permissions is very 
useful in authorization management. [15] 
 
Fig. 1. Key component of RBAC 
 
Although,  in  a  certain  organization, 
mapping  these  permissions  to  never-
changing roles can happen at one time and 
users  can  be  assigned  and  unassigned  to 
these  roles  during  the  lifetime  of  the 
individual, making the access management 
control easier to keep. [9] 
I  consider  that  the  most  difficult  part  of 
setting  up  a  role-based  access  control  is 
that an organization must define its roles 
based  on  the  proper  processes.  They 
consider  that  the  technical  part  of  the 
solution is the easiest phase. They have to 
provide an enough flexible schema in order 
to  be  able  to  cope  the  reorganization’s 
rigors.  With  “Introduction  to  Role-Based 
Access  Control”,  NIST  (see  references) 
provides an appropriate explanation: “With 
role-based access control, access decisions 
are based on the roles that individual users 
have as part of an organization. Users take 
on assigned roles (such as doctor, nurse, 
teller, manager). The process 
of  defining  roles  should  be  based  on  a 
thorough analysis of how an organization 
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wide  spectrum  of  users  in  an 
organization.” ([10], pp1) 
 
2.3.Confidentiality 
Keeping  the  information  secret  it  is 
mandatory  when  sensitive  information  is 
sent.  Confidentiality  is  considered  the 
security  goal  for  hiding  information  and 
encryption it is an appropriate solution to 
provide  it.  With  encryption,  a  plaintext 
message is modified with a cryptographic 
algorithm in order to produce a ciphertext 
message. In the same time, it is a must to 
have  the  possibility  to  decrypt  the  data 
using  a  key.  Many  different 
encryption/decryption algorithms, even if it 
is  about  a  symmetric  algorithms  (secret-
key) or an asymmetric algorithms (public 
key),  can  be  used  to  offer  different 
protection  levels  of  sensitive  data. 
Different things like key management for 
distributing  keys,  ciphers  to  use,  and 
cryptographic protocols that provide these 
services, are needed to create solutions in 
order  to  satisfy  confidentiality 
requirements. [12] 
Many higher-level protocols like Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Sockets 
Layer (SSL) (its later version), offer bulk 
encryption  between  two  points.  At  this 
level,  the  cipher  is  determined  and  the 
encryption key is known at the beginning 
of  the  protocol  in  order  to  establish  a 
“shared secret” understood on both sides. It 
is  good  to  know  that  SSL  is  a  point-to-
point protocol which can be used for one-
way  or  two-ways  authentication  between 
two  points  only.  Generally,  it  is  enough 
such  a  session  for  environments  with  a 
simple client and server in order to protect 
the data confidentiality in the transmission.  
Encryption requirement. If you have some 
encryption requirements, the portal should 
be able to put it up, but the portal architect 
has  to  foresee  that  the  cryptographic 
mechanisms will impact the performance. 
[13] 
Requirements.  Generally,  to  have 
requirements satisfied, it is enough to have 
a simple SSL/TLS connection between the 
user and the portal. If not, that means it is 
necessary  to  be  size  encryption  between 
the  user,  the  portal,  and  all  nodes,  web 
services  involved  and  enterprise 
applications  in  the  solution.  (thereby,  the 
solution becoming a bit more difficult). 
Secret data. If it is needed to keep some 
confidential  information  away  from  web 
services  (the  encryption  needs  to  be 
directly  between  the  portal  and  the 
eventual  data  source),  you  will  need  a 
shared  secret  between  the  portal  and  the 
data  source  (not  just  bulk  encryption 
between  the  nodes).  Here,  XML 
Encryption,  a  W3C  standard,  being  quite 
useful for this. [12] 
 
2.4.Data Integrity 
In transit, ensuring a non-altered data is a 
must.  To  validate  the  integrity  of  a 
message means to use techniques in order 
to prove that data integrity is kept. Because 
on  a  TCP/IP  network  could  occur  some 
message injection, packet tampering, or IP 
spoofing,  many  applications  require  a 
digital  signatures,  a  MAC  (Message 
Authentication Codes), or hash algorithms. 
The  portal’s  architecture  offers  integrity 
challenges regarding users and the portal, 
and also between portal, web services and 
the enterprise data source. Beginning from 
requirement set, SSL/TLS may provide it 
(message  integrity  between  users  and 
portal). In addition, other standards can be 
used to achieve integrity. One example is 
XML Signature (a W3C standard), which 
provides  message  integrity  in  addition  to 
non-repudiation  (see  the  next  paragraph). 
A mechanism that achieves such a solution 
for  Web  services  is  provided  by  OASIS 
Web Services Security specification. 
 
2.5. Non-repudiation 
The  side  effect  of  digitally  signing  a 
message  is  called  non-repudiation,  which 
is a security service used when a user has 
sent a transaction or a message. There are 
many business-to-business (B2B) systems 
where non-repudiation is often an essential 
requirement.  Considering  the  digital 52                                                           Security aspects for business solution development on portal technology 
 
signature  is  based  on  public  key 
encryption,  the  sender  of  the  message 
cannot repudiate successfully the fact that 
he  signed  the  message.  Although  non-
repudiation is tied in the context of an user 
signing something, we also can bring this 
term when discuss about an enterprise with 
portals, applications, and web services. A 
portal may sign a portion of its message to 
a Web service, and a Web service may sign 
a portion of its messages. A side effect of 
digitally  signing  a  document  is  also 
integrity.  Because  the  signed  message  is 
actually  the  signature  of  the  hash  of  the 
message used for proving integrity, many 
simply  view  non-repudiation  as  very 
strong integrity. XML Signature is a W3C 
standard  used  for  providing  non-
repudiation, and is used in other standards, 
such  as  the  WS-Security  standard.  The 
following section describes such standards. 
[12] 
 
2.6. Auditing 
Audit  is  the  process  of  verifying  that 
security requirements have been satisfied, 
with  corrections  suggested  where  they 
haven’t  been  met.  Essential  to  effective 
auditing  is  that  actions  are  traced  and 
logged  through  all  parts  of  the  system. 
With  web  applications,  this  means  that 
logging  of  significant  operations  must 
happen in the web server, web application 
and  data  layer,  in  addition  to  the  web 
application  itself.  Events  of  interest 
include:  errors,  failures,  state  accesses, 
authentication,  access  control  and  other 
security checks, in addition to application-
specific operations and actions. Care must 
be taken to protect the integrity of logging 
and  trace  data,  even  (and  perhaps 
especially) in the case of system failures. 
Logs that are tampered with or destroyed 
are  useless  in  performing  an  effective 
audit. Auditing of log and trace data can 
either  be  done  manually  or  it  can  be 
automated and often a combination of both 
is  used.  Either  way,  auditing  should  be 
done  on  a  regular  basis.  Automated 
systems  that  continually  monitor,  detect, 
and in some cases even correct (or at least 
recommend  corrections  for)  security 
problems  can  be  particularly  useful  for 
maintaining  a  secure  web  application. 
Somewhat related to logging and auditing, 
Web  applications  should  be  careful  to 
ensure that errors or failures somewhere in 
the  system  do  not  introduce  security 
vulnerabilities. Attackers, for instance, are 
often  able  to  exploit  the  detailed  error 
information provided by web applications 
to gain unauthorized access. 
 
2.7. Session Management.  
Web-based  applications,  in  contrast  to 
desktop-based  application  clients,  have  a 
challenge  with  regard  to  where  client-
related  state  information  is  stored.  A 
desktop  application  would  store  state 
locally on the client machine, but because 
of the relatively stateless nature of the web 
browser,  client  state  in  web  applications 
tends to be stored remotely on the server. 
The  challenge  then  becomes  securely 
managing  and  associating  session  state 
with  an  authenticated  client  identity. 
Unlike  the  other  areas  mentioned  above, 
session state management is not strictly a 
security  concern.  However,  the  potential 
for security vulnerabilities in this area as 
well  as  its  unique  relevance  to  web 
applications merit its discussion here. 
Many  web  application  containers  include 
built-in  session  management  capabilities, 
and  in  most  cases,  it  is  desirable  to 
leverage this functionality where possible. 
When  session  state  management  must  be 
built by the web application, care must be 
taken to ensure that session state can not be 
tampered  with  and  is  securely  (i.e., 
cryptographically)  and  consistently 
mapped to  an authentication token. From 
the  client  perspective,  session  identifiers 
are  often  included  in  cookies  that  are 
automatically saved and presented by the 
web browser. Such information could also 
be presented elsewhere in user input data. 
Care must be taken to protect the integrity 
and  confidentiality  of  these  session 
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information to gain unauthorized access to 
the system (see the attack scenario below). 
As  much  as  possible  web  application 
interfaces should be constructed such that 
users  can  keep  their  session  state  secure 
(often this means including sensible logout 
procedures, among other things). 
 Grid Portal Security Requirements 
So  far,  we  discussed  about  security 
concepts  (for  portal).  From  now  on,  we 
will  present  the  security  needs  of  web 
applications discussed above. 
To their advantage, Grid resources tend to 
have their own security (authentication and 
authorization in particular) mechanisms in 
place, so breaking into a Grid portal, while 
concerning, may not necessarily allow the 
attacker access to backend Grid resources. 
For instance, simply being able to submit 
jobs through a portal is not useful without 
proper Grid credentials  to  authenticate to 
the  actual  job  execution  service. 
Consequently,  the  key  security  challenge 
of most Grid portals is that at some level, 
they manage Grid credentials on behalf of 
clients. Compromised Grid credentials are 
an  extremely  serious  security  breach 
because  they  allow  an  attacker  to 
effectively  impersonate  a  valid  Grid  user 
until the credentials are revoked or expire. 
Thus,  extra  care  must  be  taken  in  the 
management  of  these  Grid  credentials, 
which  can  effectively  be  viewed  as  a 
special kind of session state. The integrity 
and  confidentiality  of  these  credentials 
must  be  maintained  even  in  the  case  of 
errors  or  failures.  Accesses  to  the 
credentials  should  be  logged  and 
monitored  continuously  for  suspicious 
behavior.  Further  the  credentials, 
especially  if  stored  on  disk  must  be 
protected from other users or applications 
running on the web application server. A 
compromise  elsewhere  in  the  server’s 
software  stack  should  not  lead  to 
compromise of user’s Grid credentials. 
 
Vulnerabilities of Web Applications 
A  great  challenge  in  developing  secure 
web applications is that the vulnerabilities 
in any component of the architecture can 
often  result  in  compromise  of  the  web 
application as a whole. For instance, even 
though  the  code  of  a  particular  web 
application might be carefully written and 
free of security holes, vulnerabilities in the 
web server could still be exploited, causing 
the secure web application to be hijacked 
or  overridden  with  a  malicious  version. 
Another  challenge  of  the  architectural 
complexity  of  many  web  applications  is 
that it is often difficult to configure all of 
the components correctly and securely. So, 
even if the components as  developed  are 
free  of  security  vulnerabilities, 
misconfiguration can unwittingly open the 
web application to compromise. 
The  Open  Web  Application  Security 
Project (OWASP) compiled a list of ten of 
the  most  common  security  vulnerabilities 
afflicting Web applications [17] (and thus 
Grid portals, which are just a specific type 
of web application): 
  Unvalidated  Parameters  –  input 
contained in web requests is not properly 
checked (by the application) before being 
acted on. Attackers can craft parameters to 
hijack the application or cause it to behave 
in  dangerous,  unexpected  ways.  Injection 
Flaws,  Buffer  Overflows,  and  XSS  Flaws 
are  all  specific  types  of  Unvalidated 
Parameter vulnerabilities. 
  Broken  Access  Control  –  access 
control mechanisms work inconsistently or 
incorrectly, allowing unintended access to 
resources. This is particularly troublesome 
for  web  application  administrative 
interfaces. 
  Broken  Authentication  and  Session 
Management  –  authentication  problems 
can  range  from  weak  authentication 
mechanisms  that  are  easily  broken  (plain 
text  secrets  to  retrieve  forgotten 
passwords),  to  insufficient  session 
protection (exploiting access to one set of 
session  information  to  gain  access  to 
someone  else’s)  to  forged  sessions  or 
session  cookies  (allowing  session 
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  Cross-Site  Scripting  (XSS)  Flaws  – 
involves  exploiting  an  invalidated 
parameter vulnerability to send a script to 
the web application that is in turn delivered 
to  and  executed  by  the  end  user’s  web 
browser.  Buffer  Overflows  –  specially 
crafted  input  results  in  the  execution  of 
arbitrary code on the target server. This is 
particularly  problematic  if  the  server  is 
running as root or an administrator account 
as the malicious code will also have those 
privileges. In general, Java applications do 
not  suffer  from  this  type  of  vulnerability 
(although the JVM itself could). 
  Injection  Flaws  –  in  contrast  to  the 
other  invalidated  parameter  attacks,  this 
refers to when injected code or command 
strings  are  passed  through  the  web 
application  directly  to  some  backend 
system. SQL injection attacks are probably 
the most common. 
  Improper Error Handling – this type 
of  vulnerability  surfaces  when  error 
messages  displayed  to  the  user  in  some 
way reveal details about how the system or 
application works (the attacker could then 
exploit this knowledge). This is typically a 
problem  when  very  detailed  stack  traces 
are  displayed  to  the  user  giving  some 
information of the structure of the code and 
its operation. Attackers can also probe for 
inconsistencies in error messages returned 
(“file  not  found”  vs.  “access  denied”)  to 
gain  a  better  understanding  of  the 
application. 
  Insecure  Storage  –  storage  of 
sensitive  data  (passwords,  account 
information,  etc.)  without  proper 
encryption or access control mechanisms. 
This could be on disk, in a database, or in 
memory. Usually one of the other exploits 
is  needed  to  actually  gain  access  to  this 
insecure data. 
  Denial  of  Service  –  when  the  sheer 
volume of requests to the web application 
overwhelms  the  capacity,  denying  access 
to legitimate users. This is usually an even 
more troublesome problem as web server 
DoS attacks (like SYN flooding), because 
it’s  very  hard  for  web  applications  to 
distinguish  between  legitimate  and 
malicious requests. The complexity of web 
applications  usually  means  a  fairly  low 
threshold of concurrent connections needs 
to be exceeded to deny access. 
  Insecure Configuration Management 
–  problems  here  range  from  unpatched 
software  to  unchanged  insecure  default 
settings to outright configuration mistakes 
caused  by  incomplete  or  incorrect 
understanding  of  some  very  complex 
software. Clearly this is a human problem 
as  much  as  a  software  problem,  but 
delivering  software  that’s  easy  to 
understand, easy to configure and comes in 
a  secure  configuration  out  of  the  box 
would certainly help. 
 
2.8. Key Security Standards 
With  a  significant  role  in  portal 
development, we will continue with a brief 
overview  of  security  standards  which  a 
portal developer needs to know. 
 
2.8.1.  SSL and TLS 
Created by Netscape, SSL (Secure Sockets 
Layer) and TLS (Transport Layer Security) 
are  higher-level  encryption  protocols  that 
are  used  to  assure  data  integrity  and 
confidentiality  between  two  points.  Also, 
they can be used for mutual authentication 
when both parties have digital certificates. 
Although,  the  both  are  very  similar 
(because  TLS  is  based  on  SSL)  and  in 
most  cases  we  simply  refer  to  both 
protocols as SSL, they will not interoperate 
(there are subtle differences).  
In  an  easy-going  language,  SSL  with 
HTTP  are  called  HTTPS  Sessions  (a 
process  providing  confidential  web 
transmission). A portal developer consider 
that  a  SSL  session  can  protect 
confidentiality and data integrity between 
the user and the portal, but also between 
the  portal  and  its  next  communication 
point. [12] 
 
2.8.2.  XML Encryption 
Being used to encrypt elements of an XML 
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standard  that  operates  XML  documents 
and XML element-level confidentiality. It 
can be used with key exchange algorithms 
and  public  key  encryption  in  order  to 
encrypt documents to different parties. A 
great  advantage  of  XML  encryption 
(unlike  SSL,  which  is  decrypted  at  each 
point)  is  that  it  can  be  used  in  solutions 
with multiple network nodes between the 
portal and the data source. 
 
2.8.3.  XML Signature 
XML  Signature  is  a  W3C  standard  that 
assures  the  message  integrity  and  non-
repudiation of XML documents. Any part 
of  an  XML  document  can  be  digitally 
signed – becoming self-validating when it 
has a public key. XML Signature is based 
on a public key technology in  which the 
hash  of  a  message  is  cryptographically 
signed;  this  provides  integrity  and  non-
repudiation.  When  portal  communicates 
with Web services, XML Signature has an 
important role. Because of self-validating, 
user’s  credentials  can  be  put  on  SOAP 
messages beyond the portal. [14] 
 
2.8.4.  SAML 
Security  Assertion  Markup  Language 
(SAML), is  an OASIS  standard which is 
used  for  pass  authentication  and 
authorization  information  between 
different parts. In a portal environment, a 
portal can “declare” that it authenticated a 
user, having in the same time some certain 
security  credentials.  A  SAML  assertion 
can  be  digitally  signed  using  XML 
Signature. It is good to know that SAML 
can  solve  significant  challenges  in  Web 
services  security,  because  signed  SAML 
can travel between different platforms and 
organizations.  Anyone  trusting  the  signer 
will  trust  the  credential.  SAML  is  an 
important standard, and many open-source 
toolkits are available. [12] 
 
3.  Grid  construction  –  General 
principles 
This section briefly highlights some of the 
general  principles  that  underlie  the 
construction of the Grid. In particular, the 
idealized design features that are required 
by a Grid to provide users with a seamless 
computing  environment  are  discussed. 
Four main aspects characterize a Grid: 
 Multiple  administrative  domains  and 
autonomy.  Grid  resources  are 
geographically  distributed across multiple 
administrative  domains  and  owned  by 
different  organizations.  The  autonomy  of 
resource owners needs to be honored along 
with their local resource management and 
usage policies. 
 Heterogeneity.  A  Grid  involves  a 
multiplicity  of  resources  that  are 
heterogeneous  in  nature  and  will 
encompass a vast range of technologies. 
 Scalability. A Grid might grow from a 
few integrated resources to millions. This 
raises  the  problem  of  potential 
performance  degradation  as  the  size  of 
Grids  increases.  Consequently,  apps.  that 
require  a  large  number  of  geographically 
located resources must be designed to be 
latency and bandwidth tolerant. 
 Dynamicity or adaptability. In a Grid, 
resource failure is the rule rather than the 
exception. In fact, with so many resources 
in a Grid, the probability of some resource 
failing  is  high.  Resource  managers  or 
applications  must  tailor  their  behavior 
dynamically  and  use  the  available 
resources  and  services  efficiently  and 
effectively. [3] 
 
The components that are necessary to form 
a Grid are as follows: 
 Grid  fabric.  This  consists  of  all  the 
globally  distributed  resources  that  are 
accessible from anywhere on the Internet. 
These resources could be computers (such 
as  PCs  or  Symmetric  Multi-  Processors) 
running  a  variety  of  operating  systems 
(such  as  UNIX  or  Windows),  storage 
devices,  databases,  and  special  scientific 
instruments  such  as  a  radio  telescope  or 
particular heat sensor. 
 Core Grid middleware. This offers core 
services  such  as  remote  process 
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storage access, information registration and 
discovery, security, and aspects of Quality 
of  Service  (QoS)  such  as  resource 
reservation and trading. 
 User-level  Grid  middleware.  This 
includes  application  development 
environments,  programming  tools,  and 
resource  brokers  for  managing  resources 
and  scheduling  application  tasks  for 
execution on global resources. 
 Grid  applications  and  portals.  Grid 
applications are typically developed using 
Grid-enabled  languages  and  utilities  such 
as  HPC++  or  MPI.  An  example 
application,  such  as  parameter  simulation 
or  a  grand-challenge  problem,  would 
require  computational  power,  access  to 
remote data sets, and may need to interact 
with  scientific  instruments.  Grid  portals 
offer  Web-enabled  application  services, 
where users can submit and collect results 
for their jobs on remote resources through 
the Web. 
 
In attempting to facilitate the collaboration 
of  multiple  organizations  running  diverse 
autonomous  heterogeneous  resources,  a 
number  of  basic  principles  should  be 
followed so that the Grid environment: 
 does not interfere with the existing site 
administration or autonomy; 
 does not compromise existing security of 
users or remote sites; 
 does  not  need  to  replace  existing 
operating  systems,  network  protocols,  or 
services; 
 allows remote sites to join or leave the 
environment whenever they choose; 
 does  not  mandate  the  programming 
paradigms,  languages,  tools,  or  libraries 
that a user wants; 
 provides  a  reliable  and  fault  tolerant 
infrastructure  with  no  single  point  of 
failure; 
 provides  support  for  heterogeneous 
components; 
 uses  standards,  and  existing 
technologies,  and  is  able  to  interact  with 
legacy applications; 
 provides appropriate synchronization and 
component program linkage. [3] 
 
As one would expect, a Grid environment 
must be able to interoperate with a whole 
spectrum  of  current  and  emerging 
hardware  and  software  technologies.  An 
obvious analogy is the Web. Users of the 
Web  do  not  care  if  the  server  they  are 
accessing  is  on  a  UNIX  or  Windows 
platform. From the client browser’s point 
of view, they ‘just’ want their requests to 
Web  services  handled  quickly  and 
efficiently.  In  the  same  way,  a  user  of  a 
Grid  does  not  want  to  be  bothered  with 
details  of  its  underlying  hardware  and 
software  infrastructure.  A  user  is  really 
only  interested  in  submitting  their 
application  to  the  appropriate  resources 
and getting correct results back in a timely 
fashion.  An  ideal  Grid  environment  will 
therefore  provide  access  to  the  available 
resources in a seamless manner such that 
physical  discontinuities,  such  as  the 
differences  between  platforms,  network 
protocols,  and  administrative  boundaries 
become completely transparent. In essence, 
the  Grid  middleware  turns  a  radically 
heterogeneous  environment  into  a  virtual 
homogeneous one.  
 
The following are the main design features 
required by a Grid environment. 
 Administrative  hierarchy.  An 
administrative  hierarchy  is  the  way  that 
each Grid environment divides itself up to 
cope with a potentially global extent. The 
administrative  hierarchy  determines  how 
administrative  information  flows  through 
the Grid. 
 Communication  services.  The 
communication needs of applications using 
a  Grid  environment  are  diverse,  ranging 
from  reliable  point-to-point  to  unreliable 
multicast communications. 
The  communications  infrastructure  needs 
to support protocols that are used for bulk-
data  transport,  streaming  data,  group 
communications,  and  those  used  by 
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 The network services used also provide 
the  Grid  with  important  QoS  parameters 
such  as  latency,  bandwidth,  reliability, 
fault-tolerance, and jitter control. 
 Information  services.  A  Grid  is  a 
dynamic  environment  where  the  location 
and  types  of  services  available  are 
constantly  changing.  A  major  goal  is  to 
make  all  resources  accessible  to  any 
process in the system, without regard to the 
relative location of the resource user. It is 
necessary to provide mechanisms to enable 
a rich environment in which information is 
readily  obtained  by  requesting  services. 
The  Grid  information  (registration  and 
directory) services components provide the 
mechanisms  for  registering and obtaining 
information  about  the  Grid  structure, 
resources, services, and status. 
 Naming services. In a Grid, like in any 
distributed system, names are used to refer 
to  a  wide  variety  of  objects  such  as 
computers,  services,  or  data  objects.  The 
naming  service  provides  a  uniform  name 
space  across  the  complete  Grid 
environment. Typical naming services are 
provided  by  the  international  X.500 
naming  scheme  or  DNS,  the  Internet’s 
scheme. 
 Distributed  file  systems  and  caching. 
Distributed  applications,  more  often  than 
not,  require  access  to  files  distributed 
among  many  servers.  A  distributed  file 
system is therefore a key component in a 
distributed  system.  From  an  applications 
point  of  view  it  is  important  that  a 
distributed  file  system  can  provide  a 
uniform global namespace, support a range 
of  file  I/O  protocols,  require  little  or  no 
program modification, and provide means 
that  enable  performance  optimizations  to 
be  implemented,  such  as  the  usage  of 
caches. [3] 
 Security  and  authorization.  Any 
distributed system involves all four aspects 
of  security:  confidentiality,  integrity, 
authentication, and accountability. Security 
within  a  Grid  environment  is  a  complex 
issue  requiring  diverse  resources 
autonomously administered to interact in a 
manner that does not impact the usability 
of  the  resources  or  introduces  security 
holes/lapses  in  individual  systems  or  the 
environments  as  a  whole.  A  security 
infrastructure is the key to the success or 
failure of a Grid environment. 
 System  status  and  fault  tolerance.  To 
provide a reliable and robust environment 
it is important that a means of monitoring 
resources and applications is provided. To 
accomplish  this  task,  tools  that  monitor 
resources  and  application  need  to  be 
deployed. 
 Resource  management  and  scheduling. 
The  management  of  processor  time, 
memory,  network,  storage,  and  other 
components  in  a  Grid  is  clearly  very 
important. The overall aim is to efficiently 
and  effectively  schedule  the  applications 
that need to utilize the available resources 
in the Grid computing environment. From 
a  user’s  point  of  view,  resource 
management  and  scheduling  should  be 
transparent; their interaction with it being 
confined to a manipulating mechanism for 
submitting their application. It is important 
in a Grid that a resource management and 
scheduling service can interact with those 
that may be installed locally. 
 Computational  economy  and  resource 
trading.  As  a  Grid  is  constructed  by 
coupling  resources  distributed  across 
various  organizations  and  administrative 
domains  that  may  be  owned  by  different 
organizations,  it  is  essential  to  support 
mechanisms  and  policies  that  help  in 
regulate resource supply and demand [1], 
[2]. An economic approach is one means 
of  managing  resources  in  a  complex  and 
decentralized  manner.  This  approach 
provides  incentives  for  resource  owners, 
and  users  to  be  part  of  the  Grid  and 
develop  and  using  strategies  that  help 
maximize their objectives. 
 Programming tools and paradigms. Grid 
applications  (multi-disciplinary  apps.) 
couple resources that cannot be replicated 
at  a  single  site  even  or  may  be  globally 
located for other practical reasons. A Grid 
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and  tools  to  provide  a  rich  development 
environment.  Common  scientific 
languages  such  as  C,  C++,  and  Fortran 
should be available, as should application-
level interfaces such as MPI and PVM. A 
variety of programming paradigms should 
be supported, such as message passing or 
distributed shared memory. In addition, a 
suite  of  numerical  and  other  commonly 
used libraries should be available. 
 User  and  administrative  GUI.  The 
interfaces  to  the  services  and  resources 
available  should  be  intuitive  and  easy  to 
use.  In  addition,  they  should  work  on  a 
range of different platforms and operating 
systems. They also need to take advantage 
of  Web  technologies  to  offer  a  view  of 
portal  supercomputing.  The  Web-centric 
approach  to  access  supercomputing 
resources should enable users to access any 
resource from anywhere over any platform 
at any time. That means, the users should 
be  allowed  to  submit  their  jobs  to 
computational  resources  through  a  Web 
interface  from  any  of  the  accessible 
platforms such as PCs, laptops, or Personal 
Digital  Assistant,  thus  supporting  the 
ubiquitous  access  to  the  Grid.  The 
provision  of  access  to  scientific 
applications through the Web (e.g. RWCPs 
parallel  protein  information  analysis 
system  [16])  leads  to  the  creation  of 
science portals. [3] 
 
4.  Conclusion 
Nowadays, security is a hot topic and it is 
obvious  that  data  needs  to  be  protected. 
Taking  into  consideration  that  architects, 
portal  administrators  and,  of  course, 
developers  are  faced  with  a  variety  of 
factors  when  planning  for  portal 
application security, it is very important do 
not  forget  the  significant  role  of  security 
aspects  and  required  standards  in  portal 
development. 
According  to  the  American  Heritage 
Dictionary,  a  portal  is  “a  doorway, 
entrance,  or  gate,  especially  one  that  is 
large  and  imposing”.  The  intent  behind 
such structures is really one of security, to 
allow the welcome visitors through, while 
keeping unwelcome intruders out. From a 
technological  perspective,  a  portal  is 
something that provides a convenient entry 
point to resources, applications or content 
located elsewhere. Early Web portals were 
typically web sites with search engines or 
indexes  to  other  content  on  the  World 
Wide Web. 
Since all of the content accessible through 
these  web  portals  was  publicly  available 
anyway,  everyone  was  welcomed  in  and 
security  was  barely  a  concern.  In  Grid 
computing, the resources of interest are not 
websites,  but  data  and  computational 
resources, services and applications. Thus, 
the goal of a Grid portal is to provide a 
convenient  entry  point  to  these  Grid 
resources, typically via a Web-based front-
end.  While  many  Grid  portals  expose 
relatively  general  purpose  functionality 
like launching jobs for remote execution or 
retrieving  remotely-stored  data,  they  can 
also include application specific interfaces 
customized for a particular domain. 
Security gains prominence in Grid portals 
largely because of the nature of the Grid 
resources  they  expose.  Many  Grids  link 
together  powerful  clusters  of 
computational power and large scale data 
stores containing confidential, classified or 
proprietary  information.  A  compromised 
Grid  portal  could  allow  an  attacker  to 
harness  these  powerful  computational 
resources  to  launch  a  large  scale  attack 
elsewhere on the  Internet or to  gain user 
access to probe for privilege escalation or 
root compromise, for example. 
Generally  speaking,  “We’ve  done 
tremendous work to secure computers but 
nothing  to  secure  the  human  operating 
system. To change human behaviour, you 
need to educate and train employees, not 
just once a year but continuously. Like you 
continually  patch  computers  and 
applications,  you’re  continually  training 
and  patching  human  operating  systems.” 
([5], pp.1) 
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